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Article 9

Post-Lecture Discussion
SPEAKER:
MODERATOR:
SPEECH:
DATE:

JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
JOHN H. ROBINSON
"SOVEREIGN GOD, SOVEREIGN STATE, SOVEREIGN
SELF"
MARCH 2, 1991

Professor Robinson: It seems that what Ms. Elshtain has done is to
ransack history for a set of propositions leading to a powerful conclusion. First, cosmos has been thought to be better than chaos
for some time now, since day one you might say. Or, to use her
own language, symphony is better than cacophony. Second, there
is a need for what I would like to call salience to achieve either
symphony or cosmos, which is the Greek word for order. Now the
question is: How salient does the salience have to be? The thrust
of the question is: To what extent does salience require unity?
This is the universalism/particularism issue that Professor Elshtain
refers to.
As I understand Ms. Elshtain's work, she finds that sovereignty, as classically understood, leverages off of the recognized need
for a salience and asserts or takes too much. This is where we
conflate power with violence without understanding what we are
up to. What she wants to do, in accord with a significant Polish
figure now living in a nation inside the city of Rome, is to understand sovereignty functionally, such that the purpose that it serves
determines the limit of the claim of sovereignty in any case. This
would give us a relatively new notion of sovereignty. If we accept
and understand this notion of sovereignty, it would provide a context in which the kinds of questions that we have been addressing
at the conference over the past two days would be more resolvable
than they are under sovereignty classically and rigidly understood.
Partidpant It is interesting that the noted philosopher residing in
Rome, as well as other philosophers, are all coming out of a tradition of philosophizing that is very much in tension with the State.
Also, there are people who came out of a set of political recognitions where they suffered the depravation of overweening state
sovereignty, and, at the same time, they suffered the dislocations
of not having viable civic identity.
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It is interesting that the combination of philosophical and
political current that have come together here yield this alternative
that I have been trying to play with in some way that I hope is
fruitful.
Participant:The concept of sovereignty has had much more of a
gradual development than your presentation indicates. It is a long,
long process of evolution. It is true, of course, that the concept of
sovereignty has been organized, and that it further identifies the
external side of sovereignty.
The internal side of sovereignty requires you to know where
the power of interest lies. Over time, part of the confidence of
sovereignty has mentally changed, particularly because the human
rights concern has changed so much.
The internal side of sovereignty is no longer a question of the
unified will as a center; rather, its limitations are on the part of
the State, which flows from the freedoms that are recognized in
the human rights system.
As to the external side of sovereignty, there also have been
very fundamental changes as a consequence of the development of
international human rights. States no longer have the possibility of
unlimited internal control, at least if they want to be part of the
international society. The states must conform to another set of
rules which limit the number of internal options of the sovereignty. As a consequence of this, we have a much more open and
flexible concept of sovereignty which is very different from the
earlier views of sovereignty.
On the other hand, we also have to understand the complex
circumstances of the time. At a time when they were trying to find
some structure, there was very frightening chaos and terrible fighting. It is also a question of the development of the whole mentality of trying to live together. The human rights system in itself is
contributing to a new way of thinking of how we can live together.
Professor Elshtain. You have offered many points, and you are quite
right about the development. Let me just offer a few very brief
comments on what you have said. It is interesting to note the
different emphasis placed on the alternative sides of the questions.
Some emphasize the disorder and the deaths that may result when
there is no secure locus of political control or final arbiter of what
counts as order. Others stress the "mounds of bodies," sacrificed
in the name of the creation of sovereignty.
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For example, in Eugene Weber's Peasants into Frenchmen, Weber focuses on the many people suffering horribly because of the
requirements of the notion of sovereignty. In order to create a
nation state, sovereignty does not permit the particularity of certain groups.
You are a bit over optimistic about the constraints on internal
sovereignty. Certainly, you have articulated an ideal that states do
not have unlimited power, since there is an international community out there, a watchdog organization of sorts. All of that is true.
Nonetheless, nothing stopped Saddam Hussein from gassing the
Kurds. Nothing stopped three military hunters in Argentina from
causing a minimal 9,000 people to disappear.
Human rights came in as a powerful way to call those regimes
to task in the aftermath of those degradations. But when the violations are actually happening, it is very difficult to intervene. It is
no surprise that it is the human rights group in Argentina that
had the most success in helping stop the hunters.
It seems to me that many of the concerns, which are almost a
fantasy of total control, have not gone away. They did get encoded
in a version of sovereignty that can have a rather more benign or
rather more despotic face. Even in societies like our own that are
supposed to prevent that despotic face from being displaced and
working its will, the protection has not served as an entire break
on those in power. We have seen this on a number of occasions,
especially in times of war.
Partidpant.I think it is wise to try to avoid the use of the term
"sovereignty." Quite outside the restraints that the human rights
movement imposed, there is a fundamental and profound reason
to avoid the term "sovereignty." If "sovereignty" is sovereign authority-supreme authority-then you have the question of who is
going to restrain the supreme authority. Especially when you have
so many nation states-160, 170, or 180-all claiming to be sovereign.
Global interdependencies cause a functional necessity of cooperation. When nation states cooperate and interact with one another across state boundaries, they just cannot assert sovereignty.
Third World countries claimed to welcome foreign investment; but
the moment you invest and take certain advantages, the countries
claim that the investors infringe on foreign sovereignty. When we
talk about sovereignty as an abstract term, it is very important
contextually to clearly define what we are talking about. It is prob-
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ably a term that is subject to more abuse and misuse than even
the doctrine of intimidation.
The notion of "human rights" significantly changes the contemporary meaning of "sovereignty." "Sovereignty," as developed
back in the 16th and 17th century, emphasized the personal sovereignty of monarchy. Today we talk about sovereignty of the people-popular sovereignty. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, article 21, paragraph 2, exactly reflects this notion. It emphasizes that the people should be the very basis of determining
the power of the government by genuine free elections. Popular
sovereignty is not something to be invoked in absolute, abstract
terms. Consider Saddam Hussein. He invokes the name of sovereignty, but he means his own personal sovereignty. He was not
acting in the real best interest of the people of Iraq. Hussein did
not give the people of Iraq the opportunity to express their popular will. If we take this notion of sovereignty seriously, the authority comes from the people, and the ultimate risk is upon the people rather than a few self-proclaimed rulers. Sovereignty is still
based upon human rights in the sense of authority of the people.
That notion of sovereignty also would justify self-determination.
When a group of people attempts to become self-independent
and has the government's consent, then we can see a significant
contemporary meaning. This should be the basis of how this new
world should be governed and how different territorial communities should be organized, to the extent that sovereignty is an expression of such human rights. Then we can really see a very
significant contemporary meaning.
Professor Elshtain: First of all, in the case of President Hussein, I
think he has been responding to functional necessities, as you put
them. But, this is a principle-dare I say, philosophical-position
that he has taken which I am not going to spend time spinning
out.
In my talk, I raised some alarms about the notion of popular
sovereignty as, encoded in the aftermath of the French Revolution-the people speaking with one will. I get a little nervous
when I hear "will of the people," because almost every territorial
entity is a mixed population; the territorial entity is not pure.
Various religious and political commitments define a variety of
different folks. I become concerned when we start talking about
the "will of the people," because it suggests that those who stand
apart from that will are somehow defined outside the boundary of
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the polity itself, or can be so construed. I know that is not what
you mean. I think we must be very cautious when talking about
the "will of the people," and manifest that we are also talking
about constraints on the "will of the people."
Participant.I think that point is very well taken. I do not mean to
say "one people-one will." This is exactly what the Universal Declaration sets out. The people can best express their popular wishes
through genuine free elections.
Professor Elshtain: Right. Thank you.
Participant Theorizing to a totalitarian state, serenity in some way
is between a state's given, authority and the external serenity that
has locked other states to the community,, and acquires serenity in
order to act. Leaders are shifting. They are givihg this serenity to
the states because a society with this serenity allows human rights.
ParticipantI think you really have developed the concept of sovereignty to apply to completely different situations. Sovereignty is a
mighty powerful thing. It is social to allow human rights protection, and it is not unvalued per se. Speaking of both internal
sovereignty and external sovereignty, the question is in the human
rights movement, in philosophies which are evasive of natural law.
Rights recognized by states are still not given. It is an obvious
reaction to North v. East, but I think that is something we should
see and deal with on the national level with the national governments.
How does that confer with the idea of unlimited sovereignty?
Also, regarding the European communities you mentioned, you
have to find your decision makers within the European communities.
Professor Elshtain: As you were talking, I was thinking of why it is
that many insist that the identification of freedom with sovereignty
is a problem. Hannah Arendt debunks this at some length.
Applied to human beings-both individually and as members of
groups, she claims: "[W]e are never sovereign." She opposes the
assumption that we are free-standing, free-willing selves, which is
for her what sovereignty historically meant. That assumption leads
to the view that the freedom of one man or group can be purchased only 'at the price of another's freedom.
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That is, if I am sovereign, to the extent that I am sovereign,
you are less so. She goes on: 'The famous sovereignty of political
bodies has always been an illusion which moreover can be obtained only through the instruments of violence."
It strikes me that what she is getting at here is what you say is
already happening: we cling to a notion of sovereignty, which, in
it's classical formulations, have been thoroughly softened. We hold
on to the term primarily because it continues to have functional
purposes-tell me if I am overstating your point-not so much
because there is a final willing, or saying, or absolute authority,
but because there are certain things that need to be done. We
require sovereignty to do those things.
That is the point that I think is compatible with some of the
concerns I raised toward the end of my paper, which have to do
with the softening of sovereignty in practice. Hopefully, I have
done it in a way that does not lead to the recurrence of all those
fears that so often. get expressed if you begin to soften it too
much, such as the fear that, finally, the only answer is, or the only
possibility at the other end, is some kind of terrible dissolution or
disorder.

